The average value of a particular class of agricultural exports varies widely across different destinations. This raises the question: in the event of a supply shock, such as the implementation of the Emissions Trading Scheme, can farmers offset higher costs by raising their average prices by contracting exports to lower value destinations? If the difference in value reflects different prices because producers have market power, the answer will be "yes". If the difference in value reflects differences in the quality of goods exported to different destinations, the answer is "no." This paper use a variety of trade data and techniques to examine which explanation is most likely to be relevant. While the answers are not definitive, there is little support for the hypothesis that exports are curtailed to lower value destinations when supply costs increase. D43, F12, F14, F18, Q17, Q64, Q56 
Introduction
The agriculture sector is responsible for 47% of New Zealand's greenhouse gas emissions and will be included in New Zealand's Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) in 2015 (MAF, 2009 ; NZ Government, 2010). As dairy, beef and sheep farming are the largest contributors of greenhouse gases within the sector, their inclusion in the ETS will have a large effect on this type of farming. To these farmers, the ETS represents a negative supply shock that raises costs and lowers profits. In the most adverse scenario, if farmers or processors are required to pay the full price of emissions and the price of a carbon-equivalent tonne of emissions costs $50 or more, MAF (2008) predicts a 123% reduction in the average dairy farm's profit. In a more likely scenario, in which the price of emissions is $15 per carbon-equivalent tonne and in which farmers are allocated free permits equivalent to 90% of their 2005 emissions, MAF predicts a 12% decline in national dairy profits and a 5% decline in national sheep and beef profits.
The MAF profitability estimates were calculated under the assumption that "farmers
[will] do nothing to adapt to the new cost structure over time" (p. 1). This assumption is unrealistic as farmers can alter their production techniques in response to changes in input prices or pollution charges. Moreover, it is sometimes suggested that farmers and processors could adapt to the new cost structure by increasing their average prices, either by reducing the quantity exported to markets in which they have market power, or by reducing exports to the countries with the lowest prices. In general, the more that New Zealand exporters have market power, the more they will be able to raise average prices in response to a cost shock.
In this paper, we explore whether farmers are likely to have sufficient market power to raise their prices by examining the pattern of export shipments and receipts in different countries over the last two decades. Unfortunately, there is no single definitive technique we can use.
Rather, we approach the question from a variety of different angles. Overall, we find little evidence that agricultural producers have enough market power to allow them to raise average prices significantly in response to an increase in costs. The strongest evidence comes from the way prices in overseas countries respond to changes in the New Zealand exchange rate.
Nonetheless, the countries with the fastest increase in dairy imports in the 1990s were those with the lowest average values, suggesting there may be some scope for average prices in this sector to increase if the quantity of exports was reduced.
To establish whether producers can exploit market power to change prices in response to a cost shock, high-quality price and quantity data are needed. The difference between these studies may be due to the differences between the magnitude of European ECC and the ETS. Dean cites studies that show a marginal reduction in exports when ECC are found to be 1-2% of total exports' value (p. 6). The ETS, on the other hand, may impose higher costs on farmers. Nonetheless, the differences between many ex-post empirical studies on the effects of environmental regulation on industry and the ex-ante MAF report remain stark, partly because of the MAF assumption that "farmers do nothing to adapt to the new cost structure over time" (p. 1).
It is possible that farmers could respond to the ETS by using a different combination of production techniques to the raise the quality of their output. For instance, a cheese manufacturer could produce a more labour-intensive high-quality cheese and reduce emissionsheavy milk inputs. The scope of quality differences between products is called a "quality ladder" (Khandelwal 2008 ). "Quality" has two important dimensions: it may refer to horizontal or vertical quality. Vertical product differentiation is a feature that most consumers prefer, such as higher fuel efficiency in cars. It has been the focus of most literature on product quality, both because producers can choose different techniques or different inputs to produce at different points on a quality ladder, and because countries specialise in different quality levels (Schott 2004 ). Some products, such as electronics, have long vertical quality ladders. Others, such as agricultural produce, have short vertical quality ladders, although there is scope for horizontal product differentiation for a particular quality level. Despite this, quality ladders help explain differences in unit values across countries. Schott further noted that high-priced goods are generally more capital or skill intensive than low-priced goods in the same product category.
Horizontal product differentiation is a product feature that is preferred by some consumers rather than others, such as a car's colour. Horizontal differentiation is important as even the most finely disaggregated product category has some room for horizontal differentiation, enabling producers some scope for market segmentation through reputation, intangible marketing campaigns or inexplicable uniform differences in consumers' willingness to pay for various brands. When companies have this market power, they can set prices differently in different countries, charging premiums in some markets without losing most of their customers.
Price Variation across Countries: Market Segmentation v Quality Differences
Market segmentation occurs if New Zealand agricultural processors hold market power and can sell an identical product in each country at different monopolistic prices. Consider an example of two countries. If market segmentation occurs, the demand and marginal-revenue curves differ in slope in the two countries, but New Zealand agricultural processors have the same marginal cost curves for supplying each country. The ETS will increase the marginal cost in both markets. In response, exporters will reduce quantity and increase prices in both countries, but they will increase prices relatively more and reduce exports relatively less in the country with the steeper demand curve. with the inelastic demand curve, Germany, than in the country with the more elastic demand curve, Egypt. (P G0 to P G1 is a larger increase than P E0 to P E1 .) Despite the lower price increase, Egypt's quantity decrease, q E0 to q E1 , is larger than Germany's quantity decrease, q G0 to q G1 .
Unambiguously, New Zealand producers will reduce agricultural exports and lose surplus when the ETS is introduced. But market power through branding and product differentiation would allow New Zealand producers to increase prices to compensate, especially in countries with a steeper demand curve. This would offset the reduction in producer surplus.
In the second scenario that can explain different unit values, agricultural goods are commodities that are traded competitively, but different qualities are traded in different markets. This is illustrated in figure 2. In both markets the demand curve is perfectly elastic or horizontal, but the demand and supply curves are lower in the low-quality market, reflecting the lower price of the product. In both cases, the introduction of the ETS shifts the supply curves left.
As the figure shows, when the supply curves shifts left from S 0 to S 1 , the price remains slope) will experience a greater drop in the quantity demanded and produced. Because agricultural producers are price takers, they cannot readjust their export destination mix to increase prices.
Figure 2: Quality Differences
It is likely that the situation facing New Zealand agricultural exporters is a combination of these two extreme cases. For example, the wool industry has traditionally sold much of its wool at auction, meaning it has little ability to price discriminate. Consequently, the quality differences scenario is probably most applicable. In contrast, Fonterra is by far the most dominant company in the New Zealand dairy sector and manages multiple brands in different countries, raising their market power by reducing opportunities for price arbitrage across countries (Fonterra, 2010) .
Premium Measures
Researchers often react to the absence of information about countries' product quality by constructing ad hoc proxies, the most common of which is observed export prices (unit values Most trade data sets present the total value of imports and exports to and from a country in a particular product category at a point in time. Generally, the total quantity is also known, often measured in kilograms. The total value divided by quantity is the unit value, the value per unit of the good. It is the average price of a class of goods, measured over goods that are similar but which can differ in terms of quality. While this makes it difficult to compare across countries, because quality is not uniform, in most cases true prices are not available.
To make comparisons through time or across countries, relative unit values, the ratio of a unit value to one destination compared to another, are calculated. While relative unit values have some problems, when used to compare prices in different countries they automatically compensate for generalised price inflation, currency differences, and swings in commodity prices.
They also enable data-outliers to be pinpointed. These two measures enable us to make some inferences about the extent to which market power or quality differences have affected the differences in the unit values of the same product exported to many different countries.
The first relative unit-value measure is the "importer premium". It compares the unit value of a product imported by one country from New Zealand with the weighted-average unit value that New Zealand producers receive for that good across all countries. An importing country that paid New Zealand's mean export unit value would have an importer premium of one. An importing country that paid a higher-than-average unit value would have an importer premium above one. By comparing unit values between countries, this measure avoids the problems of general price inflation and product-specific price changes.
The second measure is the "New Zealand premium", which examines how the unit value of a New Zealand product sent to a particular country compares with the unit values of the country's imports of that good from all other countries. A particular country and product with a New Zealand premium of one means that the New Zealand product sells for the mean unit value of that country's imports of that good. A New Zealand premium above one means that that country's consumers are paying a relatively higher price for New Zealand products.
The measures are calculated as follows. First, the unit value of a product across each country that New Zealand exports to and across each time period is calculated: The importer premium (MPr) for country i is calculated by:
The value MPr measures a New Zealand product's unit value to one destination relative to other countries. For example, if this product is wine, MPr is the unit value of the New Zealand wine exported to country m in time period t, divided by the weighted-average unit value of New Zealand's wine exported to all countries in that same time period.
The second relative unit-value measure is calculated from the perspective of the importing country. This measures the extent that a particular New Zealand export (e.g. wine) to a particular destination (e.g. the United Kingdom) is priced below or above the average price of the product in the importing country and thus indicates the level of New Zealand's prices and how they are changing over time. Let the weighted-average unit value of all exports to one country in a given time period be:
where x = countries exporting to importing country
The New Zealand premium is calculated by:
In this paper we use the importer premium and New Zealand premium to measure the extent that exports to different countries have different unit values, and to make inferences about prices in these countries. However, both measures have their limitations when used in isolation, in part because of they way they can change through time in response to changes in the pattern of exports. For this reason, the measures are best used in conjunction with other indicators of export patterns. These limitations can be illustrated by example. Imagine that New Zealand wine has two vertically differentiated quality levels, high and low, and that trade data aggregates both qualities into the same category, wine. As the following examples show, changes in the importer premium (MPr) do not always indicate an increase in quality, and vice versa.
Case 1: Average changes in quality do not necessarily affect the average importer premium
Changes in the average quality of exports do not necessarily increase importer premium measures. If New Zealand exported an equal proportion of high-and low-quality wine to every importing country, the importer premium for all countries will equal one, and will stay equal to one even if, over time, New Zealand moves from producing solely lowquality to solely high-quality wine. all countries increased, the importer premiums would remain constant, but the New Zealand premium would be expected to increase -at least if the quality of exports from other countries were unchanged. However, the New Zealand premium (NZPr) may also be misleading as the following examples show.
Case 3: An importing country raises the quality of its imports from all countries
If a wine-importing country imported a fixed proportion of high-and low-quality wines from each exporting country, the New Zealand premium to that country would equal one. Even if the importing country moves up the quality ladder and starts demanding a higher proportion of high-quality wine, if it imports this new mix in equal proportions of quality from each exporting country, its NZPr in wine will still equal one.
Case 4: New Zealand is a dominant exporter to a country that increasingly imports better quality
It is also possible that the New Zealand premium could fall if NZ were a sufficiently large exporter to a country. Suppose in year 1 the United States imports 50 litres of highquality wine from New Zealand at $2 per litre, and 50 litres of low-quality wine from Bulgaria at $1 per litre. New Zealand's United States NZPr equals 1.33 while Bulgaria's United States "NZPr" equals 0.67.
1 Now suppose that in year 2, New Zealand increased its exports of high-quality wine to 100 litres, while Bulgaria's exports were unchanged.
New Zealand's United States NZPr would decrease to 1.20 despite increasing its quality mix.
As these examples show, it can be difficult to make unambiguous inferences from relative unit value measures. A constant NZPr measure through time does not mean that quality is unchanged, because there are four ways the NZPr could stay the same even if quality changed:
1. New Zealand's export quality increases but so does the rest of the world's;
2. New Zealand's export quality decreases but so does the rest of the world's;
3. The countries that New Zealand exports to are importing increasingly higher quality products at the same rate that New Zealand is increasing its export quality; and 4. The countries that New Zealand exports to are importing increasingly lower quality products at the same rate that New Zealand is lowering its export quality.
As shown below, the data suggest that the New Zealand premium to a country changes only slowly, so that the past New Zealand premium is a strong predictor of the future New Zealand Premium. When interpreting these results, note that New Zealand's export quality remaining the same is only one potential explanation, albeit the most likely. The example in case 1 does not seem to be a major problem in our data as the New Zealand premiums do vary within an importing country. Although we cannot rule it out, it seems unlikely that the quality demanded by the rest of the world is growing worse as world incomes rise. For this reason, we can infer that New Zealand is either not outpacing quality growth compared to the rest of the world or exporting similar quality over time.
Data
The import and export data used in this paper come from two sources. We use data from An enormous quantity of data are needed to calculate the New Zealand premium:
basically all trade flows between all centres for every year for a particular category of goods.
Rather than obtain this data for 10-digit product categories from scratch, we have used a dataset assembled by Feenstra (2004). Feenstra's data consists of annual import and export data in fourdigit SITC (Rev.2) product categories from 1988 to 2000. These data are aggregated from worldwide trade flow reports. Priority is given to importer countries' reports. We isolate 13 product categories that include dairy, beef, sheep, and wool. For each export and import category, the quantity of trade in kilograms and the value in United States dollars, measured in either FOB or CIF terms depending on the observation. (1) the premiums differ widely across countries, indicating either large differences in the quality or the prices of exports; and (2) the premiums for a particular country are persistent through time.
Trends in Quality Premiums over Time
Export unit values vary greatly. For unsalted butter, the highest unit value is 1.4 times as large as the lowest unit value, while for frozen sheep meat the ratio is over 8. In tables 1 and 2, products are divided into three categories according to their relative variability, measured as the standard deviation over both time and country of each premium measure. Low-variance products have a premium standard deviation of 0.5 or less, medium-variance products have a premium standard deviation between 0.5 and 1, and high-variance products have a premium standard deviation of 1 or more. (By definition, the relative premium and New Zealand premium both have a mean of one.) The lowest variance items are dairy items or wool. Much of this variation is explained by differences in unit value between countries rather than over time. For instance, beef (0111) has an importer premium standard deviation of 0.95 across all countries and all time periods, but the premium for beef exports to the United States has a standard deviation of only 0.004.
In general, the importer premium and the New Zealand premium are strongly persistent through time. For example, a country with a New Zealand premium higher than one in a given year is likely to have a New Zealand premium higher than one the next year. A straightforward way to demonstrate this persistence is to plot the relationship between the relative unit value premium from the second part of the period against its value in the first half. If the premiums are persistent, the graph will be a straight line with a slope of one. 4 Note that the importer premiums for butter vary much less than the importer premiums for frozen sheep meat, most likely because the category has much less quality variation.
Moreover, each product has one country which has a much lower unit value than the others: for butter, this is Egypt (importer premium = 0.84) while for sheep meat it is China (importer premium = 0.21). The persistence of the New Zealand premium measures suggests importing countries persistently identify New Zealand products with particular horizontal or vertical quality characteristics. These quality characteristics enable New Zealand prices to differ from those of other countries. If the characteristics largely reflect horizontal quality differences, the scope to vary prices across countries for the same product will be larger than if they reflect vertical differences, as they indicate some market power within the markets. An approximate method to distinguish these competing explanations is discussed in the next section.
Sectors of Competition
To help clarify whether a New Zealand product is generally competing on price or on quality, we use a technique based on a method developed by Karl Aiginger (1997). Aiginger divides a country's products into four types based on whether the country has a trade surplus or deficit in the product, and whether its mean unit value is higher or lower than its trading partners' mean unit value. The basic idea is best understood by example. Consider a product such as cheese. A country that imports a lot of low-priced cheese and exports a small quantity of high-priced cheese is most likely a high-cost niche producer engaging in quality competition, whereas if it is a net importer and only exports low-priced cheese, it is an inefficient producer engaging in price competition. In contrast, if it is a net exporter of low-value cheese it is most likely an efficient producer engaging in price competition, while if it is a net exporter and getting high prices, it is most likely an efficient producer engaging in quality competition.
The analysis can be conducted on a country-by-country basis, or a global basis. We primarily examine products for which New Zealand has had a large global trade surplus for most of the 13 years in the dataset. That is on a global basis, although in the appendix we also look at detailed 10-digit trade with Australia. Since most of the analysis concerns New Zealand exports, we can largely narrow the categories to two: efficiently produced price-competitive product categories or efficiently produced quality-competitive product categories. Price-competitive product categories are New Zealand exports that have a unit value that is lower than the mean unit value of imports in the same category. Quality-competitive categories are New Zealand exports that have a unit value that is higher than the mean unit value of international products in the same category. This categorisation is not fixed, and many products switch from one category to another over the 13 annual observations. Zealand exports clearly have a lower-or higher-than-average unit value. Products that both methods describe as price competitive in at least eight of the 13 years are cheese and three categories of wool. 5 Products that both methods describe as quality-competitive are fresh milk, butter, and casein; and wool fabric. 6 Most meat products were ambiguous. Under the assumption that firms find it easier to exploit market power when they are not competing on price, these results suggest that New Zealand producers of dairy products industry (excluding cheese) have the most scope to adjust prices without losing in external markets.
A complementary picture was obtained by analysing the bilateral trade between Australia and New Zealand using 10-digit product categories covering dairy and meat products for the period 1988 to 2008. There are 22 dairy products and five bovine and ovine meat products with sufficient observations to use. The results, in Appendix B, suggest that New Zealand firms competed on the basis of price in all eight cheese subcategories, but competed in terms of quality in fresh cream and milk (butter had insufficient data to analyse). They also competed in terms of quality in some specialised lamb products.
Overall, this analysis provides a way of systematically classifying some of New Zealand's agricultural exports, according to their relative price in third markets. Since the data requirements for this comparison are very large -basically all international trade flows in a product categorywe have only attempted an exploratory analysis using 4-digit trade data. Analysis by country at the ten-digit level would be more revealing about the areas where New Zealand producers are consistently able to obtain prices higher than those of competing countries in third markets. As it stands, the results show that producers of dairy products (except cheese) export at higher values than other countries, suggesting these products compete with a quality dimension, thus giving producers the greatest ability to raise average prices in the event of a cost shock.
Exchange Rates and the New Zealand Premium
In this section the response of the New Zealand premium measure to the exchange rate is estimated. If New Zealand's agricultural export markets are competitive, a change in New
Zealand's exchange rate should not affect the price importing countries pay for New Zealand products in their own currency. However, if New Zealand producers hold market power, an appreciating New Zealand dollar could be associated with a higher New Zealand premium and a depreciating New Zealand dollar should be associated with a lower New Zealand premium.
Figures 7 and 8 show how the prices of New Zealand products vary in response to changes in the exchange rate for two different cases. Figure 7 shows the case when demand is perfectly elastic (the horizontal curve) and producers have upward sloping supply curves but little market power. Both curves are measured in the importing country's currency. When the New Zealand dollar appreciates against the importing country's currency, the importing country's demand curve does not change, but from the importing country's perspective New
Zealand's costs have risen. This leads to a contraction in the quantity exported but no change in the importing country's unit value. Consequently, the New Zealand premium will not change in response to the change in the exchange rate. Figure 8 shows the case when the New Zealand producer has market power. In response to an exchange rate appreciation, the marginal cost curve rises but the demand curve is unchanged. To maximise profits in response to the rising costs, the producer should raise prices from p 0 to p 1 and the quantity should contract from q 0 to q 1 .
To examine how unit values respond to the exchange rate, we regress a time series of the New Zealand premium for a good-country pair against a time series for the exchange rate between New Zealand and that country, and test whether the coefficient is significantly different from zero: 
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is the exchange rate at time t divided by the average exchange rate over the period (the New Zealand price of a foreign currency).
The New Zealand premium is calculated using Feenstra's data. A positive and statistically significant coefficient β 1 is consistent with New Zealand exporters holding market power.
Fourteen regressions were estimated: one for each of the 13 4-digit product categories, and then all 13 together. If data were not available for all 13 years, or exports to that country were less than $12,000 in 2000, the data were excluded. This narrowed the criteria to the largest 18 export destinations. 
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These regressions provide no support for the market power model. Controlling for importer country fixed effects, we see exchange rates having little to no effect on the relative price that importing countries pay for New Zealand agricultural goods. Nonetheless, the results do not disprove the hypothesis that firms have market power. If the coefficient on the change in the exchange rate was positive and significant, it would indicate firms were able to and did alter their prices in response to exchange rate fluctuations. That they did not alter prices in this way shows they did not, rather than they could not: the firms may have a policy of not responding to temporary exchange rate changes, for instance, but they might alter prices in response to permanent cost shocks.
Do Different Unit Values Affect Exporters' Decisions?
In this section we examine whether changes in unit values in a particular market are systematically related to whether exports in that market are expanding or contracting. A variety of patterns are possible. If all markets were perfectly competitive, all prices would be the same so there would be no relationship between export volumes and the importer price premium. If producers had some market power, trade volumes and prices in an importing country would be expected to increase in response to a positive demand shock, and fall in response to a negative demand shock. In this case, agricultural producers could be expected to divert exports from destinations with falling prices to those with increasing prices, inducing a positive relationship between price and quantity changes. Alternatively, New Zealand producers may reduce prices in a particular market in response to temporary surplus production, or increase prices in response to a shortfall. In this case there would be a negative relationship between prices and quantities.
We used Feenstra's international trade data on all 13 agricultural product categories over 13 years to test whether expanding markets are associated with lower-or higher-than-usual unit values. The two relative unit value measures are compared with a measure of quantity change.
For each product, the relative quantity measure is calculated as: Tables 4 and 5 show our results using the importer premium and the New Zealand premium respectively. The importer premium was higher for contracting markets than for expanding markets for nine of the thirteen 4-digit groups. In three cases the differences are sizeable and statistically significant at the 5% level; in one case the difference is statistically significant but not large; and in two others the differences are large and significant at the 10% level. The statistically significant examples of goods with lower unit values in expanding markets than contracting markets are all dairy goods including casein, cheese, and fresh milk. It appears, therefore, that the big increases in dairy exports over the period occurred in markets where prices were at a discount to those in established markets.
The differences in the New Zealand premiums between expanding and contracting markets are less marked. For six out of ten products, contracting markets have higher New
Zealand premiums than expanding markets, but only one of these differences (fresh milk) is statistically significant. For two out of ten products, contracting markets have lower New
Zealand premiums than expanding markets, with one result (degreased wool) statistically significant. (The other markets were either nearly identical, or had too few countries to estimate.)
The evidence that expanding dairy markets tend to have lower unit values than contracting markets does not prove that dairy producers have market power. It is possible that dairy producers sell in perfectly competitive markets and New Zealand producers increased their production of lower quality goods during this period -a story consistent with the evidence from section 7 that cheese producers tend to engage in price competition rather than quality competition. Nonetheless, this evidence is consistent with the story that dairy producers have some market power, even if this stems from the existence of dairy produce quotas in high-priced markets. Since the expanding markets have typically offered lower-than-average prices, if New
Zealand dairy producers reduce output in response to a cost increase, it is plausible they could raise average prices by contracting sales in these newly expanding, low-priced markets. n/a n/a n/a Fabrics, woven, of sheep's or lambs' wool or of fine hairs n.e.s.
n/a n/a n/a Fabrics, woven, of sheep's or lambs' wool or of fine hair N/a n/a n/a Fabrics, woven, of sheep's or lambs' wool or of fine hairs n.e.s.
N/a n/a n/a
Conclusion
This paper has tried to ascertain if there is evidence that agricultural producers might be able to offset an increase in costs by obtaining higher average prices for the goods they sell. If producers have market power, they could do this by raising prices in existing markets or by diverting goods from low-priced to high-priced markets. Both strategies would represent a profit-maximising approach to a cost increase such as that which will occur when the ETS is introduced. The evidence that the average value of agricultural products varies widely by export destination means the idea has initial plausibility.
A fundamental difficulty inherent in tackling this problem concerns data -either the analysis is restricted to a particular, extremely detailed, product category (such as 18-month aged cheddar), in which case it is difficult to generalise, or it is done at a level at which each product category includes goods that differ by quality. We have adopted the latter approach, and concentrated on 13 different agricultural products for which global trade data were available, supplementing these data with more detailed product categories where appropriate. This choice meant it was possible to collect sufficient data to calculate the New Zealand premium, the measure of the premium New Zealand producers get for their product in each overseas market compared to all other exporters in the world. However, it also means that any comparison of average prices (unit values) is bedevilled with the difficulty of knowing whether quality differences or market power are the primary cause of average price differences.
Overall, we found little evidence that New Zealand agricultural producers have much market power. Possibly the most telling evidence is the unresponsiveness of unit values to exchange rate movements: when the New Zealand dollar changes value, producers do not appear to reposition their prices relative to those of similar products sold in overseas markets by producers from other countries. This does not rule out the possibility that they would not reposition their prices in response to a permanent cost shock, because they may believe exchange rate movements are temporary and respond differently to permanent and temporary cost changes. Nonetheless, the absence of evidence of a response to temporary cost changes does not provide evidence that producers can or will raise prices in response to a permanent cost increase.
The most interesting evidence concerns dairy prices. New Zealand is one of the world's largest exporters of dairy produce, but it does not get a premium price in world markets, except for fresh milk and cream. This would suggest it mainly competes on price. At the same time, dairy prices in the fastest expanding markets are lower than those in the fastest contracting markets, suggesting some market power. These two pieces of evidence are consistent with the argument that access to quantity-restricted markets provides producers with some market power, enabling them to charge higher prices in established rather than new markets. If this is the case, there is some scope for dairy producers to alter their mix of exports if costs increase, reducing exports to low-priced countries. However, it appears unlikely that this is significant enough to offset a substantial increase in costs, as the price differences by destination are relatively modest for dairy products such as butter, cheese or casein. 
